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obile technologies have grown tremendously in the past ten years. In the United 
States in 1999 there were 36.7 users per 100 people (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008). In 
2005, there were 94,745,000 mobile phone subscribers in Japan and 201,650,000 
mobile phone subscribers in the United States, while in 2009 Japan’s mobile phone 
subscribers grew to 107,490,000 subscribers and the United States grew to 285,610,580 
million subscribers, a growth rate of 13.5% in Japan and 41.8% in the United States. 
Interesting enough, most cell phone subscribers are more likely to have a higher education, 
a higher income, have a full time job, and are usually married with children (Akiyoshi & 
Ono, 2008). In Japan in 1999 there were 21.4 users per 100 people, where in 2005 there 
were 62.1 users per 100 people, a growth rate of 190% over five years. In 2009, the 
M 
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diffusion rate of mobile phone among people in individual base was 78.4% in Japan 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2010).  
In Japan, mobile phone use has grown from 1995 to 2000, skyrocketing from around 5% to 
90% of the population, and this can be attributed to the introduction of “i-mode” by Japan’s 
largest mobile service provider NTT DoCoMo, which allows mobile devices to access the 
Internet (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008). Early adopters of the Internet tended “to be 
predominantly male, young, affluent, and well-educated,” but the introduction of 
DoCoMo’s “i-mode” brought Internet technologies to the “so-called marginalized groups 
consisting of women, the elderly, the less educated, and the poor” (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008). 
Mobile technology use differs greatly between the United States and Japan, but the drivers 
behind the phenomenal growth of mobile technologies, and specifically mobile phones, can 
be attributed to common themes. Those themes are affordability, accessibility, 
compatibility, effort or ease of use, experience, perceived playfulness, perceived usefulness, 
service quality, safety concerns, social influences, and technical support. While each of 
these categories offer different motivations, they seem to show up in multiple studies 
examining the Internet and mobile technology research.  What is interesting is that mobile 
Internet in the United States has followed Japan at a considerable distance.  
In addition to the common drivers of PC and mobile applications, there are several 
applications that specifically drive the success of mobile applications including, among 
other items, mobile web surfing, mobile learning, gaming and entertainment, mobile 
banking or mobile reservations, not to mention making a phone call or texting. Mobile 
phones face several challenges when placed next to their full service personal computer 
counterparts.  These challenges are smaller screen sizes with lower graphics resolutions, 
graphical limitations and unfriendly user interfaces, small keypads, limited input 
capabilities with complicated input mechanisms, limited processing power, limited 
memory, limited disk storage capacity, less ability to surf the web and an elevated risk of 
data storage and transaction errors, not to mention battery life (Y. S. Wang, Wu, & Wang, 
2009) 
Internet use in Japan has had a much more varied history than in most western nations.  
Many of the basic assumptions in early computers and Internet designs that made them so 
accessible in places like America actually inhibited adoption in the Asian markets.  The 
QWERTY keyboard especially was an easy transition for Americans as it leveraged on their 
experience with the typewriters that were common throughout the country.  Asian countries, 
including Japan, lacked this background though since no suitable typewriter analog was 
ever adopted for the complex written languages of the region (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008).  
This meant that the keyboard interface, while it was modified to accept the Japanese 
language, was not an intuitive interface.   
The dominant language of the Internet was English at the time of initial creation, although it 
has incorporated most all language alphabets at this point. These factors combined to cause 
the penetration of Internet use in Japan to be extremely low when compared to other 
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modern nations at the time.  At the time of the introduction of mobile devices Japanese 
Internet users were only 219 per 1000, with America having 367 per 1000 at the same point 
in time  (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008). Mobile technology met a much different reception when 
introduced in Japan.  Where the QWERTY keyboard was foreign and unintuitive, mobile 
devices had systems designed to work with the Japanese language (Lindmark, Bohlin, & 
Andersson, 2004).  The new mobile interfaces were not necessarily easier to use, but it was 
not harder to use either for users that had not yet become comfortable with the keyboard 
interface (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008).  The websites themselves were also designed 
specifically for the new medium and target demographic.  This meant that unlike most sites 
at the time the users were being directed specifically to Japanese websites formatted for 
ease of use and view-ability on the smaller mobile devices (Lindmark, et al., 2004).  Ad 
campaigns in Japan also focused on the ease of use and features while not mentioning any 
recognizable terms like Internet or connection speeds.  The goal was to present the Internet 
to consumers from a mobile package that bypassed many of the stumbling points that 
plagued traditional PC access among Japanese consumers (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008). 
Japanese consumers quickly embraced the new mobile technology, with mobile devices 
quickly outnumbering PCs.  This changed the culture to the point that new users began to 
use mobile devices regardless of the technological pros and cons, and based more on 
external social pressures  (Akiyoshi & Ono, 2008).  This need to create a new structure to 
overcome the language and platform limitations of early Internet use for mobile devices led 
to an early start on the infrastructure that has seen the entire country through a massive push 
for cutting edge mobile technology, which has surpassed almost all other modern nations 
(Lindmark, et al., 2004). 
The purpose of this study is three-fold: (1) to propose a model of research based upon the 
mobile ecosystem model, (2) to understand the role of NTT DoCoMo in the ecosystem 
growth, and (3) to develop an understanding of the investment model differences between 
Japanese and United States markets. The value of this research is that it provides a first step 
in understanding the adoption and utilization of mobile technologies within an ecosystem in 
a country that has certain cultural aspects. This research is highlighted with interview 
excerpts from Takeshi Natsuno, one of the visionaries in the development of the i-Mode 
mobile Internet breakthrough. 
 
Literature Review 
In this section, we propose to review the research that is relevant to the Japanese mobile 
ecosystem research model, identifying factors in the adoption of mobile applications and 
the growth of mobile computing in Japan. While there may be overlap of certain research 
areas, we have divided the research reviewed into two areas: (1) research on mobile 
adoption, and (2) research on mobile e-payments. 
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Research on Mobile Adoption 
The research on mobile adoption is based upon the previous work of Amoroso and 
Hunsinger (D.L Amoroso & D.S.  Hunsinger, (2009)a; (2009)b; (2009)c) where research 
models were developed and analyzed using online shopping to understand Internet adoption 
patterns and factors of success in the development and deployment of Internet applications. 
The subsequent research by Amoroso and Ogawa (2010 and 2011), the model shown in 
Figure 1, was proven to be reasonable in understanding the adoption of mobile technologies 
in both Japan and the United states. The model was proposed in 2010 and tested in 2010. 
Figure 1 shows the resultant model of mobile and Internet technology adoption using the 
online shopping application. 
 
 
Figure 1. Amoroso and Ogawa (2011) Mobile Adoption Model 
 
This research by Amoroso and Ogawa (2011) looked at the adoption of Internet and mobile 
applications in the United States and Japan. The intent of this exploratory study was to 
examine factors of adoption that are common in both Japan and the United States. A 
research model was tested with data collected from 437 students in both Japan and the 
United States. Online shopping was used as the common application between PC and 
mobile technologies. This study provided managers with a framework for understanding 
mobile applications for online shopping and more importantly, for academics to understand 
the impact of certain factors influencing adoption of mobile technologies.  
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This model and results can help practitioners better understand how to meet the desires of 
their online customers. This study provides managers with a framework for which areas 
they need to focus upon when launching new online products, such as shaping and/or 
changing their consumers’ attitude toward using the Internet, making their Website easier to 
use, and enhancing the perceived usefulness of the technologies that allow consumers to 
access their products online. The model of mobile adoption also serves as an important first 
step toward subsequent predictive modeling with critical marketing variables. 
The value of the mobile adoption model to researchers would be that a clarification to 
limitation of technology acceptance model and show the possibility the difference between 
PC and mobile. We found that mobile technology is more influenced by personal 
innovativeness, inertia than that of PC technologies. The influence of the convenience 
directly to overall satisfaction is not proven in previous research. High convenience, when 
ease of use is low, was not intuitive; however, our analysis found that “perceived” 
convenience may offset the difficulties in the ease of use. Trust was found to be a key 
variable in the research by Amoroso and Mukahi (2010) in the buildup of inertia for 
increase in the adoption of technologies. 
Research on Mobile Payments  
Although the literature abounds with various models exploring the determining factors of 
mobile payment system adoption, no single framework had yet emerged prior to 2010 on 
those critical constructs from the consumer’s perspective. Research by Amoroso and 
Magnier-Watanabe (2010, 2012) summarized the findings of 24 empirical papers on mobile 
payments, where eleven constructs were found to be important predictors of actual usage 
(see Figure 2). An integrated framework was proposed and a set of general hypotheses were 
found to be supported both by prior research and would later be tested. A synopsis of the 
literature and findings is presented below. 
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Figure 2. Amoroso and Magnier-Watanabe (2010) Payment Adoption Model 
 
Japan has some of the most advanced and diverse mobile applications in the world (Ezell, 
2009). When asked about the meaning of electronic payments, more people in Japan think 
of payment systems using value-stored IC cards or mobile phones that they wave in front of 
dedicated card readers (BOJ, 2009). A recent report by the Japanese Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (MIC, 2009) shows that 29.6% of 12,805 respondents possess 
a contactless electronic money instrument, and among those respondents, 24.2% use a 
contactless integrated circuit (IC) card and 9.4% use a mobile-phone-based contactless IC 
card. In addition to a high penetration rate of mobile phones (87%), there are currently 78 
million mobile phone subscribers owning a mobile phone equipped with an integrated 
contactless IC chip (Ezell, 2009) and almost 11 million active users of mobile phone-based 
mobile payment systems (data compiled from: JR East, 2009a; JR East, 2009b; JR East, 
2009c; Suica, 2009a; Suica, 2009b; Suica, 2010a; Suica, 2010b; EDY, 2009; EDY, 2010). 
According to japan.internet.com (2010), 92.9% of 900 respondents were aware of their 
mobile phone’s capability to make electronic payments, and 23% said they actually used 
their mobile phone as electronic wallet, also known as Osaifu–Keitai. 
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A range of new services leveraging mobile networks is spreading rapidly in Japan. In 2009, 
NTT DoCoMo and Seven-Eleven Japan started “Kazasu Seikyusyo” (holding your bill in 
the air), a service allowing people to receive billing statements to their mobile phone mobile 
wallet application, and then pay their bills at any Seven Eleven convenience store in Japan 
by holding their mobile phone over the card readers set up at the counter. Some public 
transportation operators in the Tokyo area offer parents a service to monitor their children’s 
movements on the transportation network, based on their use of their IC-based 
transportation pass. Indeed, Japanese children usually start going to school on their own 
from the age of six, and a service such as Tokyu’s Kids Security Service, enables parents to 
receive email notifications to their mobile phone every time their children go through a 
ticket gate and use their IC pass (Tokyu Security, 2010). Odakyu Railways offers a similar 
service that caters to the children that use Odakyu Lines with their IC pass (Odakyu, 2007). 
Yasuoka (2009) reports that the decrease by 0.04% in the circulation of money announced 
by the Bank of Japan in 2006, the first time since 1971, can be attributed in part to the 
increase usage of electronic money. However, the high penetration rate of mobile phones 
and the existence of a majority of mobile phones capable of making mobile payments 
(Ezell, 2009) cannot alone explain the success of mobile payments. The United States 
enjoys a similar penetration rate of mobile phones, but that country offers mobile payment 
systems on a trial basis only, whereas Japan boasts more than 90 million active IC cards or 
mobile phones engaging in mobile payments for Suica/Pasmo and EDY, Japan’s two main 
electronic payment systems.  
 
Research Model 
While there is a distinct difference between mobile phone use by users in the United States 
and those in Japan, the reasons for that use seems to be multi-layered (Amoroso and 
Ogawa, 2010). There are many drivers that motivate people to purchase mobile 
technologies and, although for a myriad of different reasons, those drivers seem to cross 
borders. We noticed that there are applications that are developed for adoption and for use 
in the mobile environment. We believe that there may be cultural differences or 
infrastructure differences in each country and patterns of adoption and use of mobile 
technologies that might also be different. For example, the train infrastructure in Japan is 
significantly more embedded in the culture, and therefore, mobile applications involving 
contactless payment systems are more evolved in Japan than in the United States. Figure 3 
illustrates the high-level mobile infrastructure research model and the comparative areas of 
analysis. Bill Moyers from PBS defines ecosystems as “communities of interacting 
organisms and the physical environment in which they live” in his 2000-2001 special 
reports titled “Earth on the Edge.” The actions of each member of the ecosystem affect 
another area in that ecosystem. Everything must balance out, or the ecosystem could fail. 
The ultimate goal of all the members is to protect and maintain the wellbeing of the 
ecosystem as a whole (Sugai, Koeder, & Ciferri, 2010). 
8
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Figure 3. Mobile Ecosystem in Japan – Model for Research 
 
An ecosystem model has certain characteristics that are important to understanding mobile 
adoption and widespread utilization. An ecosystem has a set of players that are vitally 
interconnected. All members of the ecosystem are members of the larger team, and their 
understanding of the overall health of the ecosystem in total is paramount. Therefore 
collaboration is vital to having a working ecosystem. Another related goal is the concept of 
Kaizen or ongoing improvement (Sugai, Koeder, & Ciferri, 2010).  
The overall mobile ecosystem in Japan has six components including (1) handset 
manufacturers, (2) carriers, (3) infrastructure providers, (4) application developers, (5) 
content developers, and (6) payment systems.  Certain components of the Japanese mobile 
ecosystem project are highlighted on Figure 3, as they include factors or characteristics for 
the overall ecosystem that we are investigating at ten universities in Japan. For example, to 
understand how carriers flourish in the mobile ecosystem, we have to study business model, 
investments, value, and using research and development to foster innovation. Payment 
systems in Japan require an understanding of mobile purse, Felica chip technologies, 
financial institutions, and data processing. Infrastructure providers need to incorporate 
mobile monitoring, mobile Internet search, augmented reality, and location services. 
Application and content developers are providing the richness both in terms of usability and 
ease of use.  
9
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Case Study NTT DoCoMo 
The analysis we conducted is based upon the NTT DoCoMo organization – the largest 
mobile company in Japan, with a net income of ¥494 billion. NTT DoCoMo was founded in 
1992 when Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation decided to spin off its mobile 
division to target the new market. ("DoCoMo" is shorthand for "Do Communications Over 
the Mobile Network" as well as a play on the Japanese word "dokomo," which means 
"everywhere,") DoCoMo has risen to become the largest mobile carrier in Japan through a 
history of innovative moves and reacting to the Japanese market. With a user base of over 
56 million, almost half of the total Japanese population, it is a powerful player despite 
losing much of its market share to rivals KDDI and SoftBank Mobile. NTT DoCoMo’s 
launched its mobile Internet service i-mode in 1999, which many unexpected to fail as it 
was a new form of connectivity for mobile carriers. DoCoMo’s i-Mode added Internet 
access, email, and other networking capabilities to cellular phones in Japan. To succeed in 
the changing market NTT DoCoMo must begin to look at creating new markets and 
revenue streams to create value going forward. Traditional strategies must be realigned to 
the changing realities of the market and consumer demands to facilitate horizontal or 
vertical growth into new markets.  
Our contact point for NTT DoCoMo was Takeshi Natsuno, Professor of Keio University, 
was formerly Senior Vice President of NTT DoCoMo, where he developed the business 
strategy of all NTT DoCoMo’s multimedia-related services, including i-Mode and strategic 
alliances with partners, suppliers, content providers and key Internet players. Mr. Natsuno 
has led the development of culture-changing mobile services between 2000-2005 including 
e-wallet, mobile payments, mobile games, credit card settlements, and i-concierge. Mr. 
Natsuno is the author of i-Mode Strategy (Nikkei BP Planning, Inc., 2000), a la i-Mode 
(Nikkei BP Planning, Inc., 2002), and Keitai-no-Mirai (The Future of Mobile Phones), 
Diamond, Inc., 2006). He graduated from Waseda University in 1988 and the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1995. 
We conducted an interview with Mr. Natsuno on March 14, 2011, the founder of the i-
Mode and e-payment systems in Japan in 1999-2005, originating from NTT DoCoMo. We 
categorized the interview data by ecosystem factor as presented in Figure 1. All of the 
comments below are extracted from the Natsuno interview without the interviewer 
interjections. The interview comments were manually categorized based upon the six 
ecosystem factors, where in some cases certain interview data was classified into two or 
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The analysis is based upon the interview with Natsuno and other references regarding the 
fifteen-year period leading up to the present, where Japan has taken a leadership position 
with its mobile industry. First, we wanted to know how did it all get started in 1999 with i-
Mode. Second, we asked Natsuno to comment on each of the mobile ecosystem players. 
 
Mobile Ecosystem Players #1 and #2: Carriers and Infrastructure Providers 
Natsuno commented that the main impetus for the huge success of the Japan mobile 
ecosystem was the risk takers. Who are the risk takers? The mobile carriers were the risk 
takers, specifically NTT DoCoMo. Natsuno comments, “We added new functionalities 
every year. In 1999, the phone had only email and an HTML browser, but the second 
version of the phone featured midi file download capabilities for ringtones. It began selling 
in December 1999. February 1999 was the black and white display of i-Mode phones, but 
ten months later, midi and color LCD came out. And the next one was January 2001, which 
had the application download capability and gaming functionality, as well as full color 
screen for all the handsets and other additional features.”  I-Mode was the Internet and 
email capability of the mobile phone, launched in 1999 by NTT DoCoMo after extensive 
research in university labs. Natsuno states, “With i-Mode, I really tried to make the browser 
and the application capability of the phones as close to Internet applications as possible. 
Almost all the technology I adopted was from the U.S. because in the U.S., the technology 
is Java and HTML. Everything was Internet standard.” In Japan, the four major carriers 
were competing with each other. Japanese carriers were using different systems, for 
example KDDI was using CDMI, and DoCoMo moved from 2G to 3G. From the user 
perspective, there’s no differentiation. That means theoretically, if four operators have the 
same service, same coverage, same network, and same system, of course the market would 
go into equilibrium with 25% for each carrier. 
 
Mobile Ecosystem Player #3: Payment Systems 
In 2003, NTT DoCoMo added substantial new functionality by introducing payment 
systems. In Japan, the carriers had to take a risk to get more return coming out. The initial 
risk for this application was very heavy, but they needed to do so because of the 
competition. In 2000, nobody was talking about payment systems. At NTT DoCoMo, 
payment systems required partnering with major delivery suppliers, such as JR East and 
convenience stores in the Kanto area. Payment systems were predominantly commission-
based with a focus on volume rather than content revenue. The commission was 9% per 
transaction, where NTT DoCoMo’s interest was in increasing the traffic rate. Natsuno 
comments, “I didn’t care about the content revenue because the value of what the content 
provided, did not have as much value. I just set the commission ratio up for 9%, which is 
11
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very, very low compared to the American carriers. I thought it was a good strategy because 
to make the mobile wallet, if I made it totally exclusive to DoCoMo, then it was too hard to 
get the partners’, in this case, the content providers’ or application developers’ support. So I 
did it intentionally, and I decided the name ’Osaifu-Keitai‘ as well.” NTT DoCoMo 
partnered with pre-paid and post-paid e-money card companies to develop Passmo and 
Suica systems. The Sony Felica chip, embedded into the mobile phones, enabled consumers 
to utilize contactless payment technologies to conduct their transactions. This was 
extremely successful for JR East, a company that supplies trains and related support 
systems. And to do that, Sony was saying that if carriers, such as NTT DoCoMo, would just 
buy their technology and start to provide the form factor, then all the application partners 
would come in. This would then provide a first-mover disadvantage for NTT DoCoMo. 
Because afterwards, AU, KDDI, and Softbank would come into mobile payments and NTT 
DoCoMo needed to allow them to use the same technology. Otherwise, if they started to do 
different things, it would not be profitable. But if all the handset manufacturers followed the 
same strategy as Sony, the mobile ecosystem would thrive.  
 
Mobile Ecosystem Player #4: Handset Manufacturers 
It appeared that manufacturers didn’t take a risk at all. Instead, certain mobile handset 
manufacturers really tried to slow down progress in the mobile industry, such as the 
integration with the Internet industry. Natsuno comments on the business model, “That’s 
the business model I set up (at NTT DoCoMo). And by having $17 billion to $20 billion 
coming in, I could keep incentives for new handsets, and the new handset should have some 
new features. Every time the same user upgraded their handset from an older handset to a 
newer one, the (network data) output will go up. With a single handset release, we added a 
camera; then we added flash capability; then we added PDF viewers. When we buy phones 
from Nokia for example, we mandate some specifications (for Japanese carriers), and then 
I’m committed (at DoCoMo). For example, if I said 300,000 units, then they made them. 
They didn’t have to take an inventory risk. They didn’t have to take any risk of non-sales. 
Their profit is almost guaranteed. So for Japanese manufacturers, this is an easier job 
because they didn’t have to take any risk.” Looking at the industry ecosystem, the balance 
of power between the operators and the manufacturers appeared to be quite a bit different 
than the United States or Europe. The carriers tended to have most of the power in the 
ecosystem. This was evident where the carrier didn’t even allow the manufacturer to put 
their name or logo on the mobile device. 
 
Mobile Ecosystem Player #5: Content Providers 
Content providers were not in the initial mix where strategy was being decided for the 
industry in Japan. The first wave of standardization was terrible because nobody was 
talking about the content providers. Initially, nobody was talking about the application 
12
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developers and the big, industry-changing applications that could result, such as payment 
systems. Actually, the biggest motivation for the content providers was very simple. 
Natsuno states, “All the risk to make services popular was taken by the mobile operators. 
And because of that, last year, the content charges, content amount, and content market on 
iPhone, as officially reported, was around $3 billon. And DoCoMo was giving out 91% to 
content providers, so many content providers went public in the past ten years, which is fine 
because as far as I could keep $20 billion revenue coming in from the traffic, I can forget 
the $3 billion subsidy to content providers.” 
 
Mobile Ecosystem Player #6: Application Providers 
In the mobile industry in Japan, almost all the customization was on the application layer. It 
was not the hardware layer. Just like the current Samsung phones for Android, developers 
are scrambling to build applications to catch up to Apple, who has the large iTunes and 
iStore applications. Natsuno states, “They’re applications! It’s a software development! 
Why is it so difficult? The amount of work is the same, so the cost would be the same. This 
is natural for everything, right? But from the Japanese manufacturers’ point of view, as far 
as they are dealing with Japanese carriers, they needed customization to sell phones to India 
or China. For the content providers, if all the carriers are using a different name, it’s 
terrible. It would be better to make everything equal. But to do so, I needed a business 
model for DoCoMo.” NTT DoCoMo continued to develop integrated applications in each 
new release of their mobile phone operating system and handsets, such as screen lock when 
mobile phones are lost and the iConcierge service. 
 
Conclusions 
By using the ecosystem model, we were able to understand how Japan was successful in 
creating a mobile industry. Creating those innovative technologies in the Japanese market 
was more of a “push” theory, as we discovered in our research. The final question that we 
asked Natsuno was to describe the business model of the mobile ecosystem from the NTT 
DoCoMo perspective. We wanted to know whether the business model in Japan for mobile 
technologies was built around a “push” theory or a “pull” theory, see Figure 4. Could this 
business model work in the United States as well?  Natsuno states, “So this is a business 
model. Nintendo is doing it. The Nintendo price is like $200, right? But it’s too cheap, and 
they’re getting the profit back from the licensing fees and royalty. Same as PSP. And the 
same for the subsidy model, incentive model with Japanese operators. Some say this is a 
terrible business model and that they are taking a heavy risk. But as a result, I could get 
huge returns coming out pushing innovative technologies.  Who took the risk? They (the 
carriers) took a huge risk. So, back to 1999, when everybody, all the world, everybody was 
talking about the Internet and everybody was dreaming about the wireless Internet; nobody 
could make it successful. Why? Because nobody took a risk. Manufacturers didn’t take a 
risk at all.” 
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We are able to conclude from this interview and our subsequent research that the Japan 
business model was centered around the "push" theory (see Figure 4) with a goal to change 
the consumer adoption patterns of mobile technology use. The vision was to change the 
entire culture of Japan. Even though the first applications were launched in 1999, we found 
that years prior to this, NTT DoCoMo had partnered with university labs in Japan to 
develop innovations and prototype mobile technology applications. This enabled the 
organization to create the vision, develop the innovation, and invest in the application 
development process. By 1999, NTT DoCoMo was then able to launch commercial 
applications, such as i-Mode to 50% of the 120 million Japanese consumers, on a country-
wide scale. 
 
Figure 4. Investment Model Comparison for the Mobile Industry 
 
We found that the risk-taking aspect of implementing the business model in Japan allowed 
them to be successful using the strategy of building the mobile ecosystem. This put NTT 
DoCoMo right in the middle of the ecosystem, where they could manage the entire set of 
players and control the business model. This differs dramatically from Apple Corporation, 
who developed their own ecosystem, with Apple as the sole handset manufacturer, and they 
became the predominant organization in the ecosystem. Can the Japanese business model 
work in the United States? Natsuno comments, “No, no, no. And if you don’t take a risk in 
the market capitalist economy, you would not get a huge return. So they (US carriers) didn’t 
take a risk. Nobody took a risk (at that time). But here in Japan, it’s different. So, we really 
concentrated on the domestic market without thinking about the outside. So the only way to 
differentiate is to move ahead.” 
 
Value of this Research and Future Research 
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Based upon the interview research data, we suggest a model for future research. We believe 
that the basic fundamental theory with respect to the United States is focused toward a 
“pull” theory, where the United States will make the investment in mobile device 
application development when they can clearly ascertain that there will be demand from 
consumers to adopt the application product. Whereas, we have found in Japan a clear 
investment earlier in the process, where mobile carriers, such as NTT DoCoMo, will partner 
with university labs to develop the mobile application, such as i-Mode and e-payment 
systems, and then mobile consumers will have new applications and functionality to adopt. 
In our future research, we intend to examine the process steps involved in mobile 
application development and adoption for the ecosystem. Future researchers may want to 
examine the mobile ecosystem in other countries and/or look at mobile purchasing in other 
countries, outside of Japan. The model is very powerful and can be considered for adoption 
in other countries and maybe for other ecosystems, including other mobile ecosystems 
(such as Android) or other industries and/or countries 
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